A couple years ago, I wrote an article on Romans 13 that walked through the passage and took the position that Paul commanded submission to all civil government except when required to sin. I also argued that legal secession and the interposition of lesser magistrates are not violations of Romans 13. However, I now want to focus on a difficult question that I did not specifically address—whether Romans 13 allows for individual civil disobedience for unconstitutional or even unjust laws.
Civil Disobedience Beyond Government Requiring Sin
All Christians agree that we should generally obey civil authorities, based on passages like Romans 13:1-7, 1 Peter 2:13-17, and Titus 3:1-3. This is simple so long as the government is doing good—protecting human life, protecting property rights, and enforcing contracts. But disagreements arise when civil government starts to act badly. Even here, all Christians agree that there is one such occasion where individuals should disobey civil government—when government requires us to sin. For example, a Christian should refuse to worship a false god if commanded by government to do so.
But what about things in between? What if government makes illegal or wicked laws that do not require us to sin? Again, there is broad agreement that lesser magistrates (such as judges, governors, legislatures, and sheriffs) may use their lawful power to check the powers of other government agents. However, the interposition of lesser magistrates often takes time. And sometimes it does not work. Sometimes a governor makes an unlawful decree followed by judges giving the rubber stamp of approval and the legislature looking the other way.
In this case, the only other option would be individual civil disobedience, which could lead to mass civil disobedience. This is where Christians really start to disagree, as many object that such civil disobedience violates Romans 13. The question is—are there times where Christians may disobey government even when it does not require us to sin?
There are actually two parts to this question: (1) whether a Christian may disobey a ruler who exceeds his authority (legal and moral), and (2) whether a Christian may revolt against a tyrant. This latter right of revolution to secure rights is taught in the U.S. Declaration of Independence—“We hold these truths to be self-evident…That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government.” Of course, this does not answer whether such revolution is permissible for the Christian. And while this question of rebellion/revolution is related, I want to focus on the former question of disobedience to unlawful or unjust laws. The different views regarding the individual Christian’s behavior toward civil government may be summarized as follows:
Obey government, unless a law (a) requires a person to sin.
Obey government, unless a law (a) requires a person to sin, or (b) is unconstitutional/unlawful.
Obey government, unless a law (a) requires a person to sin, or (b) is unconstitutional/unlawful, or (c) is unjust/wicked/irrational/overburdensome.
Position (1), the most common view today, holds that individual Christians may only practice civil disobedience when the government requires them to sin (either forbidding that which God requires or requiring that which God forbids). Otherwise, the only recourse to unlawful and/or wicked laws is exhausting legal means of resistance—such as suing the government or the interposition of lesser magistrates on behalf of the people (e.g. a state governor defies an unconstitutional federal law or state judges rule the governor is acting unconstitutionally). This is the Lutheran position, seen in the Augsburg Confession’s teaching that “Christians are necessarily bound to obey their own magistrates and laws save only when commanded to sin” (Art. XVI). It was also John Calvin’s position, who held that if lesser magistrates do not act, then “citizens must recognize that these disasters are sent on them by God as a punishment for their sins.”[1] A modern example of this position is found in David Innes’s Christ and the Kingdoms of Men (though I think his position is inconsistent and ends up actually being closer to what I am arguing).[2]
Position (2) goes further by saying individuals may also disobey unconstitutional laws—meaning the law violates either the state or federal constitution. This position was advocated by 19th-century American Presbyterian pastor John Lafayette Girardeau:
There are two cases in which obedience to government may be refused: one in which the subject is required to infringe his conscientious convictions of what the Divine law demands, in which he is prohibited from doing what it enjoins, or directed to do what it forbids; the other, in which the fundamental law of a country, and the clearly defined constitutional rights of its people, are invaded and overthrown by the existing government… The disobedience to the law of the land is really chargeable on the existing government, and not on the citizens who maintain their duty to obey the law and to resist all encroachments on the fundamental principles of the Constitution. Disobedience to government, in such a case, is obedience to constitutional law (Conscience and Civil Government [1860], pp. 9, 12).
While we may all agree that unconstitutional laws are no laws at all, this still leaves the question of who determines whether something is constitutional. In modern American law, we leave this decision to state and federal judges. (In the case of federal law, earlier American presidents and state governments also reserved the right to declare such laws unconstitutional.) Of course, many judges and other civil authorities do not follow the U.S. and state constitutions. This has particularly been a problem in the development of “constitutional law,” where judges reject the original meaning of the ratifiers in favor of novel interpretations of the U.S. Constitution (which then becomes precedent). Thus, this position says there is still a place for individual interpretation of relevant constitutions followed by civil disobedience for laws that violate the constitution. Individual disobedience can spark widespread disobedience and overturning of the law, though coordinated civil disobedience tends to work best (e.g. restaurant owners collectively decide to defy unconstitutional lockdowns and open at the same time).
Civil disobedience to unconstitutional laws has been used successfully in American history. However, it may not work as well in other countries with fewer checks and balances. Moreover, this does have the problem of determining whether something is constitutional. There are areas where constitutionality is genuinely debatable. So even if one holds this position, it makes sense to limit the application of this practice to the most clearly unconstitutional (and wicked) laws.
Both positions (2) and (3) have in common that an individual may disobey a ruler who exceeds his legal authority. However, position (3) goes further than (2) by saying that we may make the constitutional argument, but even constitutional laws may be disobeyed if they are wicked. A law may be legal, but a law that violates divine or natural law is no law at all. In such a case, the ruler exceeds his moral authority. The Westminster Confession teaches that it is the Christian’s duty “to obey” the magistrate’s “lawful commands” for “conscience’ sake” (WCF 23.4). However, since it does not expound upon what may be considered “unlawful,” both position (2) and (3) may be consistent with the Confession here (see below regarding Romans 13:5 and the conscience).
Of course, this leaves the challenge of determining what qualifies as a wicked law when it is wicked enough that disobedience should follow.[3] An example where this would be implemented is a state legislature lawfully requiring a restaurant to close for months. To make this most flagrant, let’s say the government’s proclaimed basis is to prevent the spread of the common cold, and the state provides no reimbursement for the restaurant’s lost income. In this case, the restaurant owner needs to make money to feed his family, and if people are willing to frequent the restaurant, the people and the restaurant owner and employees may defy the state legislature.
In the end, there is an element of pragmatism here. We should always first use legal means of challenging laws, including appealing to lesser magistrates to interpose against a wicked law. But if that fails and the people can coordinate widespread civil disobedience—and the government backs down and permits the disobedience, or even changes the law—why not disobey? The people are functioning as a sort of lesser magistrate, albeit unelected and unappointed. This was what happened in Britain, where resistance theory applied the role of lesser magistrates to the people themselves (though maybe going too far as it led to rebellions and revolutions). Advocates of such resistance include several Scottish men, such as Christopher Goodman in How Superior Powers Ought to Be Obeyed (1558), George Buchanan in De Jure Regni apud Scotos (1579), and Samuel Rutherford in Lex Rex (1644). The position of these men seems to fall under position (3).
Goodman said of Romans 13 that the powers to be obeyed do not include tyranny and oppression, “For though the Apostle says: There is no power but of God: yet does he here mean any other powers, but such as are orderly and lawfully instituted by God. Either else should He approve all tyranny and oppression, which comes to any commonwealth by means of wicked and ungodly rulers, which are to be called rightly disorders, and subversions in commonwealths, and not God’s ordinance…[W]hen they are such, they are not God’s ordinance. And in disobeying and resisting such, we do not resist God’s ordinance, but Satan’s, and our sin, which is the cause of such” (How Superior Powers Ought to Be Obeyed).
Rutherford said of tyranny, “That power which is contrary to law, and is evil and tyrannical, can tie none to subjection, but is a mere tyrannical power and unlawful; and if it tie not to subjection, it may lawfully be resisted…while king and parliament do acts of tyranny against God’s law, and all good laws of men, they do not the things that appertain to their charge and the execution of their office; therefore, by our Confession, to resist them in tyrannical acts is not to resist the ordinance of God” (Lex Rex).
Romans 13 Is Not So Absolute
The main pushback here from Christians to position (2) and especially position (3) comes from their interpretation of Romans 13, which they take to require absolute submission to civil government apart from the requirement to sin. However, there are two reasons Romans 13 does not teach absolute submission to all civil government.
First, the language of Romans 13 is so absolute that it does not even mention disobedience to laws that require a Christian to sin. And if there is one exception to Romans 13 that is not mentioned (the command to sin), which everyone agrees on, then there may be other exceptions that Paul does not state. The apparent absolute language of Romans 13 is not so absolute.
So how can we know what are exceptions to the general rule to submit to civil government? The reason everyone holds Christians should disobey government when required to sin is that the rest of the Bible condones such disobedience. For example, God commends the Hebrew midwives for disobeying Pharaoh’s wicked command to kill newborn boys (Exodus 1:17; cf. Hebrews 11:23). And Peter and John disobeyed the Jewish authorities when they were told to stop preaching Jesus—“Whether it is right in the sight of God to listen to you rather than to God, you must judge, for we cannot but speak of what we have seen and heart” (Acts 4:18-19). Peter and the apostles later said in Acts 5:29, “We must obey God rather than men.”
However, the Bible also condones civil disobedience even for other reasons. There are numerous examples in the Bible of God’s people defying unjust laws and rulers. The temple priests defied Queen Athaliah when they hid Joash for six years, and they even executed the queen (2 Kings 11). Saul’s army interposed before King Saul to protect Jonathan from the king’s unjust decree of death (1 Samuel 14:45). Jesus did not respond to the high priest’s question about whether He was the Christ even though the priest commanded Him to answer (Matthew 26:62-63). Jesus commanded His disciples to buy swords, even though it was illegal according to Roman law (Luke 22:36-38).[4] And the Apostle Paul recounts how he was let down the city walls of Damascus in a basket, in defiance of the governor under King Aretas who was guarding the city in order to seize him (2 Corinthians 11:32-33; Acts 9:23-25). Thus, the rest of Scripture should guide us as to when civil disobedience is permitted. And the above examples teach that there are times when disobeying unjust laws is permissible.
Second, Romans 13 teaches that God institutes the authority of civil government, but it does not teach that He sanctions all offices and individuals within every government. This leaves room for illegitimate civil authorities, to which we are not required to submit, as well as illegitimate exercises of authority by otherwise legitimate authorities. Romans 13:1 says we are to be subject to ἐξουσίαις ὑπερεχούσαις (exousiais huperechousais), which is translated “governing authorities” (ESV, NASB, NET) or “higher powers” (KJV). These authorities have been τεταγμέναι (tetagmenai), usually translated as “established” or “instituted” by God. This can either mean God providentially arranged the authorities or He ordered them according to His instructions.
Thus, there are two ways to understand the “governing authorities” in Romans 13:1: (1) ‘all existing rulers’ as providentially ordained by God (which supports the Divine Right of Kings), or (2) ‘the institution of civil rule’ (as argued by James Willson in Civil Government: An Exposition of Romans XIII). A problem with the former view is that Scripture does not equate God’s providential appointment with His sanction. For example, when Israel split from Judah under Jeroboam, God said, “They have set up kings, but not by Me; They have appointed princes, but I did not know it” (Hosea 8:4, NASB95). God certainly brought about this new kingdom by His providence (1 Kings 11:31-35), but Hosea 8:4 shows it was also without His approval. Thus, it is better to understand that we are only to submit to “governing authorities” that have God’s sanction—the institution of civil rule so far as it properly exercises authority. As even Calvin admits in commenting on Romans 13:1, “tyrannies and unjust exercise of power, as they are full of disorder, (ἀταξίας) are not an ordained government” (Commentaries on Romans [1539]). Willson says of Romans 13:1, “In short, God has ‘ordained’ civil government as Christ has ordained the ministry of reconciliation, not by merely willing its existence, but by prescribing its duties, its functions, its ends, and its limitations” (Willson, Civil Government).
This is important because Scripture tells us what kind of government Paul and Peter have in mind when they command subjection. There are clauses in the text of Romans 13 and 1 Peter 2 that assume the civil government we submit to is punishing evil and rewarding good:
For rulers are not a terror to good conduct, but to bad. Would you have no fear of the one who is in authority? Then do what is good, and you will receive his approval (Romans 13:3).
or to governors as sent by him to punish those who do evil and to praise those who do good (1 Peter 2:14).
Thus, the apostles command obedience to a well-functioning civil government, and they do not explain what to do when government itself is acting in an evil manner. This is similar to the commands for a wife to submit to her husband, for children to obey parents, and for church members to submit to elders (Ephesians 5:21; Hebrews 13:17). The fact is, the Scripture passages that command submission to authority do not address what to do when such authority acts in an explicitly evil manner. Submission to authority has its limits, and we are left to use Scripture and Scripture-informed reason to make judgments in such situations. A ruler who exceeds his authority is no longer functioning according to his divinely-ordained office, and he no longer compels obedience in such a case. Such exceeding of authority may even come to the point where the ruler’s government becomes illegitimate and warrants rebellion.
We should also notice a difference between the passages commanding submission to civil government and those commanding submission to hierarchical personal relationships (husbands, parents, masters). This difference is that the apostles only add clauses about extensive obedience for hierarchical personal relationships. Note the civil government commands:
Let every person be subject to the governing authorities (Romans 13:1).
Be subject to every human institution for the Lord’s sake (1 Peter 2:13).
Remind them to be submissive to rulers and authorities, to be obedient, to be ready for every good work (Titus 3:1).
Contrast these civil government commands to the commands for personal relationships, which make submission even more exhaustive:
Wives, submit to your husbands as to the Lord…so also wives should submit to their husbands in everything [ἐν παντί] (Ephesians 5:22, 24).
Children, obey your parents in everything [κατὰ πάντα], for this is pleasing in the Lord (Colossians 3:20).
Servants, be subject to your masters with all respect, not only to the good and gentle but also to the unjust [ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς σκολιοῖς] (1 Peter 2:18).
Not every passage commanding submission by a wife, child, and slave adds such extensive language (e.g. Colossians 3:21). However, only passages commanding submission by a wife, child, and slave add such extensive language. The passages regarding submission to civil government never say such a thing (e.g. “submit to government in everything”). And even with such extensive language, we still allow some exceptions for disobedience to husbands and parents (e.g. commanding sin, physical abuse). Thus, there are exceptions to the submission within personal hierarchical relationships, and submission to civil government is even less extensive. The implication is that there are potentially even more occasions for disobedience to civil government when it exceeds its authority. In other words, the apostles command a general submission to civil government, but they leave room for exceptions without giving a full political discourse.
The Reasons for Submission to Government
We can add to this that the government submission passages give particular reasons why we should obey civil authorities. Government is not like marriage, which is a picture of Christ and the church (Ephesians 5:22-33). Rather, rulers are supposed to punish evil and reward good (Romans 13:3), and Christians obey in order to maintain a clean “conscience” (v. 5) and avoid “judgment” (v. 2) and “wrath” (v. 5)—either God’s or maybe just the government’s. Of course, this does not address what to do when government does the opposite by punishing good behavior and rewarding bad. It is simply not always the case that by doing “what is good” you will receive the government’s “approval,” as the passage says (v. 3). Thus, Paul in Romans 13:1-7 does not tell Christians how to behave when government carries out evil by punishing good and rewarding evil.
Peter’s command to obey “the emperor” and “governors” also assumes such rulers are punishing “those who do evil” and praising “those who do good” (1 Peter 2:14). And like Romans 13, Peter gives a reason why Christian should obey civil authorities—“that by doing good you should put to silence the ignorance of foolish people” (1 Peter 2:15). Thus, the reasoning Peter gives for obeying civil government is that government punishes bad and rewards good (which is not always the case) and so that Christians can silence opponents by being good citizens. It is noteworthy that a couple verses later Peter tells slaves/servants to submit to masters, even “to those unjust” (1 Peter 2:18), yet he did not extend this qualification to civil government.
This ties in to the major objection to our interpretation, which is that Paul gave the command to submit to civil rulers when the evil tyrant Nero was emperor of Rome. So does this not mean we should submit even to evil rulers who make evil laws? The problem with this objection is that it goes against the text of Romans 13. Paul almost certainly wrote Romans while Nero was emperor, but he does not seem to have Nero (or any wicked ruler) in mind when commanding submission to civil rulers. Romans 13:3 says “rulers are not a cause of fear for good behavior, but for evil,” and then 13:4 says the civil ruler is a “minister of God to you for good.” Paul is describing a ruler who punishes evil, not good things such as the worship of God (as Nero did). Murdering innocent Christians is not “for good.” Thus, Paul could not have had Nero in mind when writing Romans 13.
James Willson says of this objection, “The description here given of the magistrate does not correspond to that of the reigning Emperor of Rome, nor to the character of his administration.” Willson then quotes Benjamin Hoadly that “either Paul was grossly mistaken in his opinion of him [Nero], or he could not be particularly meant here” (Willson, Civil Government). This objection that Paul wanted Christians to submit even to Nero’s wicked laws simply reads this point into the text. This is an assumption about Paul’s circumstance and mindset that is contradicted by the words of the text. (I inclined toward this unwarranted assumption in my prior article on Romans 13.)
The above argument may be summarized as follows:
Both Paul and Peter give what at first sound like absolute, universal commands to submit to civil government (Romans 13; 1 Peter 2).
However, the context of the commands assumes such a government is acting justly.
Further, the stated reasoning for obedience is to avoid judgment (either God’s or government’s), maintain a clean conscience, and silence the church’s opponents.
Therefore, Paul and Peter do not give an absolute, universal command to submit to civil government but a general principle that includes exceptions.
This way of approaching the commands fits with the already universally-agreed practice of Christians disobeying government when required to sin. Based on the text of Romans 13 and 1 Peter 2, exceptions to civil obedience require that government is acting unjustly and that the basis for obedience is removed—particularly that disobedience does not violate conscience (Romans 13:5). A civil law requiring a citizen to sin meets this exception because it is unjust and disobedience does not violate the believer’s conscience. However, the same can be said for a civil law that is overtly unconstitutional and evil.
Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) provides helpful analysis in this regard. He says a human law may be unjust for two reasons: (1) it is directly opposed to God’s law, or (2) it is “contrary to human good.” The latter includes a law that is for the authority’s “own cupidity or vainglory,” a law “beyond” the ruler’s power/authority (e.g. unconstitutional), or a law that imposes “burdens…unequally on the community.” Aquinas says “such laws do not bind in conscience”—which thus removes the very basis for obedience in Romans 13:5 (Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II-I.96.4).
When to Practice Civil Disobedience
So far we have made the case that the Bible allows for individual civil disobedience for unconstitutional and/or unjust laws, which means there is a place for individuals to judge the civil law. Of course, this does not tell us exactly when we should practice such disobedience. This is not a simple question, and therefore it requires godly wisdom in application.
Christian political thinkers can help guide us in this matter, such as the Italian Reformer Girolamo Zanchi (1516–1590), who said:
It is not always in everyone’s power to interpret and understand the laws in this way; instead, the common people should yield this responsibility to the princes themselves, and they should be the interpreters of the law, at least when there is no danger in delay. When, however, they cannot be easily consulted and there is a danger in delay, and the case of the law is clear to each person, then it is appropriate for the person involved, to whom the responsibility falls, or on whom the burden of State is conferred, when the importance of the law is lost, to follow his own interpretation of the law (Zanchi, On the Law in General, 37-38).
Zanchi’s position is that in general civil rulers should interpret the law, but when there is “a danger in delay” and “the law is clear,” then there are situations where an individual should “follow his own interpretation of the law.” In other words, if a law is clearly unjust/unlawful and time is of the essence, an individual may follow his interpretation of the law and disobey.
Thus, when considering whether civil disobedience is appropriate, we should address the following issues: (1) how unjust/unconstitutional the law is, (2) whether the law can be addressed otherwise in a timely manner, or at all, and (3) whether the disobedience brings about an even greater evil.[5] (The first two issues are referenced by Zanchi above.)
The first issue of the wickedness and illegality of a law is a subjective standard and will often entail disagreement. But civil disobedience should not necessarily be carried out for every unjust or unconstitutional law we come across. It seems wise to pick our battles carefully.
The second issue of whether the law can be addressed in a timely manner, or at all, requires examining the available options. Unfortunately, court cases often take a long time and cause undue delay of justice. While suing government for illegal actions and appealing to lesser magistrates to interpose on behalf of the people are the ideal solutions here, they are not always viable. There are unjust but constitutional laws that will find no remedy in the courts, and courageous lesser magistrates can be hard to come by. So sometimes there is no alternative to civil disobedience, or at least the alternative is so untimely that it is useless.
The third issue of whether civil disobedience brings about an even greater evil is again somewhat subjective. One possibility is that disobedience could bring great harm upon the church and its reputation (which seems tied with 1 Peter 2:15 saying obedience to civil rulers “put[s] to silence the ignorance of foolish people”). It is also important to consider the potential outcomes and penalties for disobedience. The consequences of both obeying and disobeying the unjust/unconstitutional law must be considered, and a wise decision must be made.
Conclusion
In general, Christians should obey civil government. And they should do so because God gives us civil government to punish evil and reward good behavior. But in making these statements, the texts imply there are situations where a Christian may justly disobey civil government. At minimum, this includes when government requires sin. But there is no exegetical or theological reason why this does not include other exceptional situations. In fact, the texts suggest that a government exceeding authority and acting wickedly would qualify as such. In other words, Romans 13 and 1 Peter 2 do not rule out situations of just civil disobedience to unconstitutional or unjust laws where the Christian can maintain a clean conscience. In such circumstances, the Christian may disobey civil government.
However, civil disobedience should generally be a last resort. We should address unconstitutional or unjust laws through legal means, including using the court system and appealing to lesser magistrates to interpose on our behalf. But when this does not happen—or cannot happen within a reasonable period of time—civil disobedience may be the best option. Yet we should reserve this for the most wicked laws and ensure that our disobedience does not lead to even greater evil.
Notes
[1] In a sermon on 1 Samuel 8, Calvin asks the question, “The Lord does not give Kings the right to use their power to subject the people to tyranny. Indeed when Liberty to resist tyranny seems to be taken away by princes who have taken over, one can justly ask this question: since kings and princes are bound by covenant to the people, to administer law in truest equality, sincerity and integrity; if they break faith and usurp tyrannical power by which they allow themselves everything they want: is it not possible for the people to consider together taking measures in order to remedy the evil?” However, Calvin responds that it is not “proper for subjects of kings and princes to rebel against them.” The only “legitimate” remedy against such tyranny for Calvin is “when there are other magistrates and official institutions” who can “restrict the prince to his proper authority.” In other words, the doctrine of the lesser magistrates. But if that does not work, Calvin says citizens must just take it as judgment—“But if these inferior magistrates do not carry out their duty and do not dare oppose his tyranny themselves, then private citizens must recognize that these disasters are sent on them by God as a punishment for their sins” (John Calvin, “Sermon on 1 Samuel 8:11-22,” trans. Douglas Kelly, The Counsel of Chalcedon [September 1992], 4).
[2] In his book Christ and the Kingdoms of Men, David Innes defends position (1) above, which is the common view today that civil disobedience is only allowed in cases where government requires sin. Innes addresses some objections to this view, including the “justice” objection that states that “we should obey only just governments…that are faithful to God in doing good, not tyrants and oppressors.” Innes’s response is that this “would not have required a command,” as we do not need encouragement “to eat our favorite food or listen to our favorite song” (157). However, this analogy is inaccurate, as it it not the case that we would all want to obey a just government. There may be times where we disagree even with “just” laws. So we still need to be taught that the government holds authority. Paul in Romans 13 is laying out general principles of government and commanding obedience as the norm—and he gives reasons for such obedience.
Innes’s oversimplification of this objection is further demonstrated when he argues, “Finally, if we are obliged to obey only just governments, then we need not obey any government, for no earthly government is simply just. The command would be meaningless” (157). This comment shows that Innes is not addressing the most nuanced “justice” objection to his position. In my case, I am not arguing (nor am I aware of anyone else arguing) that we should only obey a government that is completely just. Moreover, I am not arguing we should disobey every unjust law. Rather, I am arguing that a general attitude of obedience to civil government does not rule out occasions of individual civil disobedience. And the case for such disobedience grows the further removed a government is from the one Paul and Peter described.
We should note that Innes later concedes additional exceptions to Romans 13 than he initially lets on, particularly the possibility of civil disobedience in the case of an unlawful or unconstitutional law. Innes addresses the “reductio ad absurdum” objection, which appeals to Rosa Parks and the successful civil disobedience of the American civil rights movement. Innes responds that “it was equally the obligation of everyone else—that is, the empowered, white, Christian majority—to change the law.” He adds, “Parks could justify her defiance in the name of the more fundamental law: the United States Constitution,” and then he speaks of Martin Luther King Jr. appealing “to a comparable higher political authority…the Declaration of Independence” (160). Aside from the fact that the Declaration of Independence has no binding legal authority in the U.S., Innes makes the concession that Romans 13 is not violated by civil disobedience when based on a proper reading of the U.S. Constitution—placing him in line with position (2) above, not position (1). However, Innes also seems to think that civil disobedience is permissible in some cases where a majority should change the law for the minority, even apart from the constitutionality—which could place him even within position (3).
[3] Phillip Kayser adopts something similar to position (3) above, but he goes further by advocating a different interpretation of Romans 13. In his book The Divine Right of Resistance: Biblical Options for Opposing Tyranny (pp. 3-12), Kayser argues against a “submit with some exceptions view” of Romans 13 (which all three positions above assume). His arguments against this view are that:
Scripture’s examples of resistance (approved by God) go well beyond just disobeying when commanded to sin (e.g. Matthew 26:62-63, 68; 27:13-14; Luke 22:36-38).
Romans 13:1-7 uses absolute universal language that does not even leave the exception for disobeying government when commanded to sin.
Kayser argues that only two views take the absolute language of Romans 13 seriously—the Divine Right of Kings view and the Regulative Principle of Government view. The Divine Right of Kings holds that the king’s law and authority is derived from God, and thus disobedience to the king is disobedience to God. Few today adhere to such a view, and Kayser critiques it. This leaves Kayser defending the Regulative Principle of Government view, which he says is the dominant Reformed view in history. This view holds that the king/state can only command and enforce God’s law contained in Scripture.
Kayser argues that Romans 13:1-7 only makes sense if submission is conditioned upon the requirements of rulers laid out in the passage. I generally agree with this point, but I am not convinced of Kayser’s claim that government may only enforce God’s law contained in Scripture. He does not elaborate enough on this for me to evaluate it fully. I would instead say that every law a government makes should be consistent with Scripture and natural law. In other words, laws may be particular to circumstance (“political laws”), but government should not exceed its sphere of authority and laws should not violate Scripture or natural law. Kayser and I would probably agree on many situations of disobedience to civil government. However, I still think a “submit with some exceptions” view is the best way to take Romans 13, not his Regulative Principle of Government view. Yet I am arguing that such exceptions are greater than what many today hold.
[4] Kayser argues that Rome made private sword ownership illegal because of Sicarii attacks. He cites several works, including Christopher J. Fuhrmann, Policing the Roman Empire: Soldiers, Administration, and Public Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 184, as well as E. Jary Smallwood, The Jews Under Roman Rule (Boston: Brill, 2001), 241 (Phillip Kayser, The Divine Right of Resistance, 4).
[5] I must credit Ben Dunson with this helpful insight: https://twitter.com/BenDunson1/status/1489658825061941248.
